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---0oo--In

order to h~rvo ncoriorehurs5vo and adequrte vier of

the subject of follow servant or co-employee liability

it

is

essential at the outset to examine t .o law applicatle to the
relation of master and servant in the different stagea of its
development: and in such an examination one needs not a microscope but a field glass and a corzanding height.
In looking at the annals of the early Roman Law one must
I necessarily be impressed by the logic and brevity of its
maxims.

Evidence of their clearness and conciseness is seen

in the fact

that they have withstood the wavering changes of

over fifteen centuries and we still find many of them embodied
in the works of modern text writers and in the decisions of

our courts.
Perhaps the most striking of the r:axirts found in the
early Roman jurisprudence is the maxim "Respondeat Superior",
while closely analogous

a:Aapparently b'it a broader statement

of the same princiVple is the maxin "10,ui facit :-or alitmol fceit
per so."
The ifiaxhir

"Reslondeat Suorior" according to Kent orig-

inated in teo early stagos of tho Ronan civilization, and

dates back to that period in the Roman law when all servants
were slaves, for whom the pater-familias was responsible as a
part of his general responsibility for the family whiab ho
represented and governed.

This maxim was introduced into

the.rM*lish law about the time of Charles II.
The relation of master and servant'arises out of contract either express or implied and is analogous and similar
to that of principal and agent; the difference between the

two-consisting only in the nature of the employment, and the
extent of the authority.

Every servant acting in the exer-

cise of the master's business, and within the scope of his
employment represents the master himself, and his acts are,
in contemplation of lawthe acts of the master.

It seems however that a wrong impression has at times
more or less obtained, and still exists to a certain extent,
that the same legal principles as to the master's liability
ought to apply to cases of injuries by a servant to a servant,
and to cases of injuries by a servant to a stranger,or to the
public.

Due reflection will show however that the two re-

lations are entirely different, and the rules of law 'regard.
Ing the employee's liability to one servant for the default
of a co-servant, not only are, but for the last fifty years

have been different from those relating to t'e master's liability to those not in his employment, for the acts Qf his
servant s.
According to the weight of the American and English
authdrities;

ItThe master i~s liable to persons not in his

service, not omly for his own wrongful acts and omissions

,

but also for the wrongful acts and omissions of his servants
while acting in the scope and course of their omployment as
such, even though the particular acts or omissions were not
only unauthorized but even fqcrbidden; and resulted in loss
and

amage to him irrespective of the claims of the person

injured."

But in as far as this rule irayoses.on the

master an imputed liability, that ist, a liability beyond his
authorized acts, and defaults or a liability for faults and
omissions he did not approve, authorize, or direct- but even
forbid' it is one of manifest severity, is not based on natural J.nstice and is to be held justifiable only on the grounds
of public policy or of social duty.
The reasons for the master's liability for the acts of
his servants to the pubIic, or to strangers, can be based
upon either one of two gronds; one of which is that the master is bound to guarantee; third persons from all harm or

damage arising from the negligenco oC hirasolf, or those acting
under his authority, or

in tho, course Qf his busilness: but it

seems the better rule to waive the reasoning of such a constru tivo guarranty,

and adopt the better conclusion that he

who puts into operation an agency which he controls while he
receives its emoluments, must be held responsible for the
injuries which it incidentally infliots.

The business of

"the masetr ts as respects the public, conducted for his own
Ikdvantage and oonvenience,

the public have no conqern in it,

are not coniulte1 abolit it.and have no control over it
methods'

and if

or its

the busInbss' is' a lawful one as for example

a railroad built and operated under legislative authority,
the master although he ts not bound to guarantao the public
against accidents or domages, is still bound to take reasonable care either by himself or t1rough those who represent
hlm, to -prevent accidents and damages and he is- liable for
his servant's negligence, not siniply because they are his
servants, but because an resj-ects the public he is bound tb
conduct his business with due care and.

caution so as not to

injure or damage the rights Of others: because having for his
own convenience, pleasure, or profittxpose;Dtho public to
risk of damages,

if

damages result either th-rou1-h his fault

or thrqUgh the fault of his sorvants,

thie master will be held

liable.
. The ancient rule of IrRespondeat Suirfurior" was applied
without exception from its origin in the early Roman law until the year 1341.

But with the rapid growth of manufact-

uring, mining, and railroad enterprises; cmae.increasing
liability and responsibility for accidents arising from the
bad management of officers and agents, the insufficiency and
incompetency of workmen, and the methods of doing business;
the liabilities involved in the employment of thousands of
employees in large manufacturing centers, and on lines of
great railway companies, exposed at all times to manifold
risks and dangers gave rise to the feeling in the courts that
it operated unjustly to the large industrial enterprises, and
that the relation of master and servant in its true sense was
ixapplicable to the situation; for between employer and emplotee it became more and more difficult to apply the ordinary common law principles governing the relation of master
and servant, to t'he imore complicated methods of business
enterprise.
In the year 1837 the case of Priestly v Fowler, 3 M. & W.I.
arQse in the English courts, it being the first recorded

exception to the ancient rule of "Respondeat Superior",.and
the general principles of the law governing the relation os
master and servant.

Beach in his work on "Contributory Weg-

ligencoe" says of it;

"The decision of this case constitutes a

clear exception from which has flowed in a copious flood all
the modern law as to follow servants and common employment,
and it is not extravagant to say that the decision in its.influenct upon subsequent jurisprudence is secodd to no adjudication to be found in the reports; no other reported case has
changed the current of decision more radically then this, and
subsequent reports and text ,books contain limitations and refinements on the doctrine here for the first time announced.*
The facts of the case were as follows; a butcher sent
one of his servants to deliver meat in a wagon which had been
overloaded by another servant, the wagon broke down and the
man received severe injuries.

The court decided that the

butcher was not liable to the servant for the injuries so
received.

This case howevor does not plainly show exactly

whose negligence was the cause of the injury; that is whether
it was due directly to the overloading, or was duo to some
material defect in the wagon itself.

The decision however

seems to have been based for the most part on the Fround that

the non-application of such a rule would be to carry out the
principle of the master's liability to an alarming extent.
Lord Abinger giving the opinion of the court says; "If
the master is to be held liable in this action the -principle
of that liability
extent.

will be found to carry us to an alarming

If the owner of a carriage is responsible for the

'deficiency of tbo carriage to his servants he is responsible
for the negligence of his coach-maker,his harness-maker and
his coachman.

The master would thereby also be liable to

the servant -for the negligence of the chambermaid in

puting

him into a damp bed or for the negligence of the cook in
not properly cleaning the etensils

of the kitchen; but the

inconvenience not to say the absurdity of these consequences
is-obvious."

Again in the opinion Lord Abingor says, "The

master is only bound to provide for his servants to the best
of his judgment, information, and belief; while the servant
on the other hand is not bound to risk his safety in the employment of his master but may if he sees fit decline any
service in which he reasonably apprehends injury."

The case

decides that a servant upon entering into the employment of
his master assumes the risks of such employment.
A few years later in the year 1850 the case of Hutchin-

Co.

5 Ex.

son v The Now York,

Now Castlo and Berwia R.R.

arose in England.

This case arising upon a clearer state-

343

ment of facts and more definitely stating the law, has been
held, although a later oase than Priestly v Fowler to be tie

In th1is case a fire-

leading English case izj-on the subject.

man was injured through t-io negligence of an

engineer and Br-

on Alderson said in the opinion given by the court, "Where
several servants are employed by the sarw riaster and inj1ry
results to one of them from t4he negligence of another,
such a case we are of the opinion that the marster is

in

not

generally liable where he has selocted persons of reasonable
caro and skill." and again in his opinion he states the principle as follows,

"A servant when he undertol-es to' serve a

master undertakes as between himself and his master to run
all

the ordinary risks of the employment,

including the risk

of negligence on the d.art of a fellow servant whenever he is
acting In the discharge of his duty as servant of him who
is

the cot-on

which it

master of both.

enznciates hvs Leer

This

case in the prLicipo

followed again Fnd again In

the

numeroua cases which have since arisen under the English law.
The first

rolorto

Iorth Carolina in

acse upion this continent arose In

1841 throe years after Priestly v Fowler had

been decided by the Engl1oh courts.
strange though it

It is also.aip-areza,

soorx, that the Ncrth Cr'rolina court did

not have the epse of Priestly v Fowler

oforo them nor does

$he record show thait they hA ever hoard of it, and so we.
fin#

this doctrin

enunciated by the Judicial authorities of

both Zngland and Atlerica,

-'t or about tho, sEat

decided. indepenfiently of th

tirio and each

other.

The North Carolina case L'urray v South Carolina R.R. Co.
is reported in 2 I-.c Millips rel.orts.

In this

case upon a

locomotive owned and operated by tho defendent corporation,
while in the performance of his duties, the plaintiff was inJured owing,to the carelessness and negligence of the engin-

eer in-refusing to stop after his attention had been called to
an obstacle upon the trackz.

Judge Evans delivering the opin-

ion of the court in this case in substance says, "It is by
no means incident to the contract of service that the company should guarantee its servants against the negligence of
co-servants.
It

is

adnittod that the servant tak.s- upon hiisolf

ordinary risks of his
ones ?

ployinent.

the

Thy not the extraordinary

Neither are within the contract and I can see no

reason for adding the already k.oTm and acKncwlvC6ed liability

of a oornron carrier to the fpcts of this case without a single
anthority or doctsion to susti'In such a holding."
The counsel for tho plnintiff rou1ht to hold the company on the groun-I that tho .irurian
;

Evans in conilusion renprks;
represents his Irtlnio.l,

t",w

was ; -'assengrr,

Judge in

servant in his department

uiccessful resylt of their

labors comes from the fact that each performs his several

duties.

And it seems to re that it is on the part of the

several agents a joint undertalting,.whore each one stipulates
for the Performance of his several part.

They are not lia-

ble to the company for the misconduct of each other, nor is
the company liable to. one for the misconduct of another: and
as a general rule I would say that where there is no fault
on the part of the master he would be liable to the servants
only for their rages."
But in the next year 1342 there arose in the Supreme
Court of Massachusutts the celebrated case of rarwelll v B. &
W. LR.Co.,

4 7.etcalf 40.

The learninrg and logic of the

opinion delivered by Chief Justice Shamwin this case has made
it as has been justly said the fountain-head for all subsequent decisions upon .this ,.otnt.

it has been found again

and again, and cited with aproval by both the English and

American courts evorit ,ps first Rnnoimcod.

The facts of

this case were as follows, an engineor was injured throuih
the negllgence of a switchman who left the mwitch o-en s6
that the engine ran ofi7 the track and injured the I-laintiff.
It

was shown that the switcahan was a cartdfull and trustwor-

thy servant; the engineer Farwell sued the railroad oomany
and it was hold that he could not recover.

In this case no

actual negligence was alleged eEpinst the company, but the
basis of the claim was a supposed imIlied contract by the
master to pay one ser/ant for the damages caused to him
through the hegligence of another.

The coiurt however hold-

ing that no such implied contract existed.

Chief Justice

Shaw in delivering the opinion of the aourt said; "The gonoral rale resulting from considerations of justice as well as
policy is that he'who engages In the employment of another,
for the performance of specified duties and services for comWnsation,

takes upon hir.zel

'

the natural and ordinary risis

and perils incident to the performance of sych services, and
in

legal pres=irrption the compensation is adjusted accordingly;

and we are not aware of any

ri_,n1ple il-ich should except the

perils arising from the carelessness and ngligence of those
who are in

the same employttent.

These are perils about which

the servant Is as likely .to know, and agpinst which he can as
effectually gzard as the master, they are perils incident to
the service and which can be as distinctly forseen and provided for in

the rate of cozrapensation as any others."

FLrther in the opinion Chief Juisti o
it

.Shaw says; 0 Besides

appears to us that the arm~gent rests upon an assumed

principle of responsibility which does not

In

fact exist,

the

master is not exempt from liability because the servant has
better rneans of p.roviding for his own safety when he is

em-

ployed in imedlate connection with those from whose.negli-

gence he iight suffer, but because the imlilied contract does
not extend to inde=ify the servant aga'inst the negligence of
anyone but the master himself.

The exeorn.tion therefore of

the master from liability for the negligence of a fellow servant, does not depend exclusively upon the consideration that
the servant has better means to provide for his own safety,
but upon other grcnds.

hence the separation of the employ-

ment into difforent depnrtments cannot create that liability
when it does not arise from expross or implied contract, or
from a responsibility created by law to third persons and
strangers, for the negligence of a servant."
Since these early and leading cases were decided,

the

doctrine that a rristor whether a corporation or a private In-

dividual, where no negligence is attributable is not liable
to a servant for the Injuries or dsmmCgos caused by the negligonce or carelessrnss of a follow servant has been decided
by the courts 1both of the American and English cont inots
till it can be said to be a i~ractically undils]utod principle
of the law.

But the fact as to what constotutes fellow ser-

vice or co-eploy.rent; and who are fellow servants or co-eployoee,

Is

still

one regarding which the courts are widel#

and irreconcilably at variance; consequently we have to the
general fellow servant rule as adopted by the courts of the
different states various exceptions.
The firstand what is probably the most important of the
exceptions to the general rule is what is known as the Al~er-

ior servant or the si-eprior officer doctrine.

This limitat-

ion or doctrine is based upon the theory that there is a distinction between servants exercising no supervision over
others engaged with them in the same erqloyment, and those
who are clothed, with the control and i:&-agnagement of a distinct
departnent,

in which their duty is

superintendence.

that of direction and

This doctrine deals altogether with the

station or position which the two

-loyues

ocirljy,

and over-

looks the character of tho act out of the negligence p1 erform-

ance or non-performance of whtah the injury arose.

Beach in

his work on "Contributory Negligence" defines this limitation
as follows. "Where the negligent servant is in his grade of
employment suprlior to the injured servant, or where one servant is placed by the emp.loyeo in a position of subordination
and subject to the orders and contrdl of another, in such a
way and to such an extent that the servant so placed in control may reasonably be regarded as representing the mmster,
as his alter ego, when such inferior servant without fault and
while in the discharge of h~s duty is injured by the negligence of the sperior

servant, the master is liable in dami-

ages for the Injury.
This doctrine arose in an early Ohio case, the Little
Xaima R.R.Co. v Stevens, from the opinlon in which case the
above quotation from Beach seems to have been taken.
In considering this lirmi.tation Judge Shaw in the early
Farwell case said- "To say that the master shall be liable
because the damage is

caused by his agents is

assuing the

very point to be proved; they are his agents to some extent
and for some pur-poses,but whether he is

ticular case for their

responsible In

a per-

iigoic
iFi
F not decided by the fact

that they are for some purposes his agents."

This limitat-

ion although followed in a few.of the southern and western
states is far outweighod by the weight of authority against
it.

A ease decided in the Unitod States Supreme Court in

1884 known as the Ross case 112 U.S.

377, were an engineer

was injured through the negligence of a conductor the court
held the railroad company liable following the superior servant limitation.

But a few years later in the Baugh case

reported in 120 U.1. where a fireman was injured through the
negligence of an engineer who under the special rules of the
company, in the absence of a regular conductorwas acting as
conductor: in this case the court held the railway company

no

lliable: and the court in its decision although attempting

to distinguish the Ross case which it seemed practically illpossible to do on any grounds,from the facts of this case*but
in the reasoning of the court as given in the opinion of
Chief Justice Fuller there was a strong inclination to break
away from the superior servant rule as laid down in the Ross
case: as the following quotations from the opinion will show
will show; "It is true" the court says "that the fact that

one servant is given control over another does not destroy
the relation of fellow servants, as the inquiry in such cases

must always be directed to the real powers and duties of the
offioial and not simply to the name given to the off iee.t
Again in the course of te opinion Justice Fuller says:

"Prima

facie all who enter into the employ of a single master are
engaged in a common service, and are fellow servants, and
some other line of demarcation than that of mere control must
exist to destroy the relation of fellow servants."

It will

be seen from these quotations that if the Ross case was distinguished, and not clearly overruled;

it was distinguished

in such a manner that it will not again be followed in that
tribunal.

The superior servant limitation at present is

followed only in the following states, Ohio, Rentuckey,
Georgia, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Tennessee and
Virginia.
The second limitation urpon the general follow servant
doctrine is what is known as tho de artment or
doctrine.

onsgoeiation

This doctrine arises from the fact that in imany

large enterprises the necessities of industry have led to a
division of labor into different departments.
Thus the rule
has sprung up in a few of the states of this country that in

order to constitute servants

of the semne naster,follow ser-

vants, it is essential that they should be either actually

cooperating at the tiM,
Iness at hand,

of thu injitry,

in

the particular bus-

usual duties should bring them

or that thir

into habitual consociation so that proper care would be likely
to result.

Re-::p cting this doctrine Chief Justice Shaw in

the early Parwell case
plished is

the objOct to be accom-

'hen
"Wid;

one And the

tho m'-i:,loyurs are the same,

u,6nJ

and the severpl jersons employed derive their compensation
and authority from the same source:
difficult,to

it

would be extremely

distinguish what constitutes one department and

what a distinct dupartrnt' of ditty.
circumstances of every case :ttf

it

It

would vary with the

were made to depend upon

the nearness or remoteness of the persons fro* each other,
I

the question would imediatoly ariso,how near or how distant
must they be and yet be in

tae sane department.

smith shop persons working in
fires

may b; quito independent

few feet distant.

In

a black-

the.samae 'building at different
of e-ach other,

though only a

In the construction of a roPe walk several

may be at work on the same piece of cording at the same time,
many h.udred feet distant from each other and beyond the
reach of sight and votco yet acting together."

The language

of Chief Justice Shaw in this case lucidly states the objection to this doctrine.

It is obvioiv.ly i racticable to try and guage tho liabi -%InF-ss,

con .°ocxby the indQpenderco of it

bility of an employer In

different branchos, or the intur-eomunicatlon of those employed, for not only would it be almost iiaiossible in many
oasos to separate the work into distinct departments, and to
discern their dividing lines, but Incide-rtal duties changing
the reipticn of the u-orkron to oach other would also vary the
mast^,r's liability.

le would thus be liabla for the negli-

gence of the servant at one time and place and not at another,
so that without a perarsonal srru'rvision of all his servants in
all

their work, he could not lnow when he was rosionsible

and when he wps not.
must manifestly

It

is

result in

-klain that such a distinction

ndloes

confusion,as is

illustrated

by the situation of the law in a few states which have adopted this doctrine.

This doctrine now exists in Indiana to

a limited extent, and in the states of Illinois, Georgia,
Kentuckey,and Ten'o-esseu.

The courts of Tennessae have ap-

plied tbis doctrine in its strictest and fullest sense.
The third doctri-:;
trine is what is

if it can be called a distinct doe-

known as tho vice Tr ncial

doctrine, which

is but a limited application of the suirTfrior officer doctrine.
This doctrine is based

o

the fact that the master owes to

his servants certain -porttivo dnttes which may be stated as
follows:
lot

to furnt.h all his sorvants

The master in bonmn

with a safe and suitable pl~co in which to work.

9nd.

is boun

Thto mttr

to iv-

-'i'

car,- and diligence

in the selection Rnd retention of sufficient and competent
servants.
3rd.

The master is boumd to supply his employees with

safe and suitable nachinery,

tools,

and appliances,

and also

to keep such machinery In a safe and serviceable condition,

and to this end he i-mist raku- all needed tnsi]uct ion.
4th.
lish

It is also the duty of the master to make and pub-

such regulations,

and provisions for the safety of em-

ployees as will afford themr

reasonable protection against the

domages incident to th, perforriance of the 1'-rformance of

their resactive duties.
Those are tho certain defined y;,rsonal duties which the
master owes to hit

zervants and if the ri.asto,r deligates any

one of these so-called personal duties, the person to whom
they are so delegated is known as a vice vrincijal and for
liable.

his negligent or careless acts the master is

h-d

This seems to be the true rnle and crttrion

of follow service,

To be sure, under this rule it i. pbsolitoly es'.n~ial that
the injured um!;loyeo,
the injury should

and the cri!.!oycu whoro ,giiuco

-,.- Eorvants of the

caused
By this

rurastor.

rule we have In every case a crucial test, and a determin ing
criterion from which to judge.
The true test undr.,r this rule as to whethor an oriltloyee
ocupies the position of a fellow servant to another amlloyee
or is the representitive of the master is to be found not in
the grade or rank of the offonding or inJitred servant, but
must in every .aso lo ) dtermintid by the character of the act
being :erformed bv the offun.ing servant by which the ether
employee is Injured: that is, whethor the person whose status
is in question is charged with the :,erfornmance of a duty which
properly belongs to the master; if so then he is but the agent
of the master for that -iur-jose and tho; rules of principal and
agent apply.
This doctrine h.as been announced and followed by mar
the most able courts of this country.

In the state of New

York this has been considered the p-roper tost.
Boston R.R.Co., 5Z IT.Y.
rule I apprehend is

of

In Flike v

504, Judgo Chirrch said, "The true

to hold tho corpcration liab2e for neg-

ligence in respect to such acts and duties as it

is

required

to

)rform Rs master, without regard to the rank or title of

the agent tntrnsted With their .perforntanoe.

As to sueh acts

the agent occuites the place of the corporation and the latter
is liable for the manner in Which they are -.urforT-ed".
And later tn Irts i. v Bmbbit, 81 N.Y. 51c,
stated the rule ?s fol*o': os,

Judge Rapallo

"The liability of the r.aster is

thus made to depend upon the character of the

act In the

performance of which the injury arises without regard to the
rank of the employo,performing it.

If it is one pertaining

to the duty the master oues to his servants he is responsible
to them for the nrnr.er of its 1,orfornance."
Thus it would seem, that imder the jurtice of this rule
the

Aster's liability is

precisely coiv-nt-i;ruratu with the

master's personal duties towards hls servants, and as to the
servant who in the p;?erforrnance of these duties represents the
master he can only be a vice -irincaipl for whose acts and neglects the master is liable; beyond this tho eaniloyer is liable only for his own -,
-rsonal negligence.
This is a -,lain, sound, se,

and

racticsl line
'
of die-

tinction; one can easily find it and define it; it begins and
ends with the personal duties of th
to refine it

rstor, and any attuxt

bas#d u-cn tho notion of grades in

tho service

or whPit in much the same thing distinct deprtxments in the
service wll

only bring Rbout the confusion of the Ohio,

Tennessee, and 1entuckey experiments;

hose courts have con-

strutted * labyrinth in which the jitdges who made it

be able "to find no end irn the -Rndering .i~azes lost".

--- THE EID---

seem to

